A s the debates about the future shape of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Fifth Edition, continue, a review of one of the liveliest arguments, about melancholia as a diagnostic category in its own right, appears timely.
In "A Case for Reprising and Redefining Melancholia," Dr Gordon Parker 1 argues persuasively for melancholia being positioned as a separate, independent subtype of depression. He points out that the diagnosis of melancholic depression can be delineated with relative precision, and that it has important clinical consequences in favouring biological therapy (drug and electroconvulsive) above psychotherapy, and broad-spectrum antidepressants (ADs) over narrow-action selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors. Conversely, and disconcertingly, the current accretion of varied depressive syndromes under only one diagnostic umbrella precludes both targeted treatments and more productive research of the different entities. When Dr Parker 1 reminds us of the limitations to current, unitary, severity-based grouping of depressions, it is hard not to agree with his argument for a separate melancholic category. The DSM symptom-based diagnoses have a century-old, historical foundation and have served satisfactorily for shorthand communication among mental health professionals and for administrative purposes. However, for what is now really needed and missing, both in practice and in research advancement, the current classification has fundamental limitations. As Dr Parker points out, when we now ask for a diagnosis helpful in selecting effective treatment, informing about prognosis and advancing research of the underpinnings, we leave empty-handed. To be fair, DSM-III was a step forward, compared with its predecessors, which were based largely on speculative theories. Nevertheless, stressing reproducibility without accompanying validity of mood disorder diagnoses created entities that are inadequately demarcated and highly heterogeneous. The current mood disorder categories neither serve the clinical need for guidance in treatment nor inform psychobiological research. Dr Parker's metaphor of "major breathlessness" standing for "major depression" 1, p 183 is indeed instructive: it shows how in other areas of medicine these nonspecific entities would not stand as acceptable or valid constructs of disease. One can think of many similar examples from medicine where a seemingly reproducible but abundantly heterogeneous and invalid diagnostic construct would not survive. Of course, a dispute about the classification of depressions is not new. Dr Parker revives another question that raged a few decades ago: Is there 1 large unitary or 2 distinctly binary depressions (for example, "endogenous depression" and "reactive and (or) neurotic depression" 1, p 286 ). . Amusingly, he points out that the binary model of low mood was already mentioned by St Paul in the Bible. Dr Parker spent a long time searching for the right answer 2, 3 and discovered that the solution depends on methodology: eliminating nonspecific symptoms leads unavoidably to 2 types of depression; 2 distinct categories that had been employed in clinical practice for decades. Despite this evidence, a unitarian view was introduced in DSM-III and the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, with clinical depression varying merely dimensionally. This approach has been consolidated during the past 3 decadeslong outlasting its expiry date. While dissatisfied, Dr Parker 1 does not favour a return to the old binary categories; he proposes a new revision delineating melancholia from a group of other, nonmelancholic depressions. And he supports his argument by the utility and validity of his revision and recommends concentrated studies to improve melancholia's clinical distinction. It may be worth mentioning that similar arguments about the limitations of DSM approach can be made not only about depressive disorders but also about the bipolar spectrum. Dr David Healy's observations support Dr Parker's main tenet. He has already greatly contributed to the story of melancholia, by thoroughly analyzing its roots and unfolding them over time. 4 Now, in "Melancholia: Past and Present," 5 Dr Healy first sums up the historical perspective on melancholia in a helpful, concise précis and then offers a new contribution: to investigate commonalities in the clinical presentation of melancholia in different eras. To accomplish this, he compares 2 databases, 1875-1924 and 1995-2010, from psychiatric facilities in North Wales. In this interesting comparison, Dr Healy 5 finds that such contrast is consistent with developing perceptions. During the first historical period, patients with a diagnosis of melancholia showed a classic profile of endogenous onset, with remission after 6 months, neurovegetative features, and, commonly, psychosis. Melancholia was liable to start abruptly in patients, and usually remitted well, despite an ominous outcome in some cases. Further, in the old cohort, there was also an unusually low rate of recurrence. However, I must point out that these were observations on hospital readmissions, and such change is to be expected, to some extent. By way of example, in large databases on the natural course of mood disorders collected with Jules Angst (see Angst et al 6 and Grof and Angst 7 ), we found that patients were much more often hospitalized during the initial episodes of illness but later recurrences were mostly treated on an outpatient basis. Recurrent clinical course of mood disorders is one of the few points all researchers agree on. Thus it is amazing that during the past 50 years there have been so many theories explaining the biology of depression and yet none has offered some plausible explanation of what might have induced spontaneous recovery and recurrence. Dr Healy 5 demonstrates how this remitting and recurrent course was striking, even a century ago. He points out the important implications for research: any theories about the pathology underpinning the disorder need to incorporate propositions regarding mechanisms that may lead to recovery. As for the Wales cohort from the modern era described in this issue by Dr Healy, 5 first admissions for severe depressive disorders are more likely than the historical ones to die by suicide, or have much more frequent readmissions. These average poor outcomes in contemporary patients with severe depressive disorders are seen as support for distinguishing between melancholia and other depressive disorders and for treating them differently. But in addition, these findings raise some uncomfortable questions about our present management and treatment strategies. Do the current treatments with ADs perhaps potentiate suicidal risk as Dr Healy argued elsewhere? 4 Such a comparison of the 2 cohorts is interesting but because of numerous possible confounding variables, a convincing interpretation would be difficult. However, several of the points raised by Dr Healy 5 should be stressed and require thoughtful consideration: some statements that we now frequently read repeated in the context with contemporary depression may be considerably misleading because they were actually attained on earlierstudied and -diagnosed patients with classical melancholic depressive disorder. To wit, the increased mortality rates or neuroendocrine changes connected now to major depressive disorders originated often from research on patients essentially suffering from melancholia. In practice, then, the lack of distinction between the subtypes of depression may be markedly adding to an apparent deterioration in outcome. Grouping different depressions together may also cloud the links that any of these conditions may have with physical disorders, in particular cancer or cardiovascular ailments, and may abstruse research on outcomes.
The papers 1,5 appearing in this issue together represent an important contribution to the intense debates about DSM-5 and how to move forward in an enlightened way with psychiatric classification. The arguments made by Dr Parker and Dr Healy for setting aside melancholy as a distinct depressive entity appear persuasive. Subtyping depressive disorders could make treatment more targeted and research more productive. The term melancholia carries with it some historical baggage of various interpretations and may not have optimal connotations, but subtyping of depressions appears justified.
Just some nagging questions: Are the 2 subtypes enough? Should they be defined primarily by symptoms again? Has not the time come to move ahead further? Decades ago, internal medicine successfully moved beyond diagnosing different pneumonias by auscultation and percussion of the chest and beyond the concepts of Dr Parker's major breathlessness. The advance would not have been achieved by splitting earlier categories; new research and new technology were needed. In mood disorders possible new directions have already been envisaged: developmental course, comprehensive clinical profile, long-term treatment response, genetic markers and family history, neurobiological approaches, imaging-the list keeps stretching.
